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P R E F ACE
The results of a study on the potential United States uranium
supply are presented in this paper. This study was conducted in the
M.I.T. Energy Laboratory, as part of the continuing research on energy
supply and demand (N.S.F. Grant # GI-39150). The results of this study
will be utilized in conjunction with an electricity supply model under
development.
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ABSTRACT
A time analysis of uranium exploration, production and known re-
serves in the United States is employed to reveal industry trends. The
basis for this analysis is the data collected, processed and published
by the A.E.C.'s Grand Junction Office. This analysis reveals that
exploration, thus the quantity of known uranium, has been governed
by demand. Factors affecting the prospects for future discoveries
are discussed. The author concludes that the resource base
may be substantially greater than is presently known, and calls for a
national research effort to better quantify the extent of our uranium
resources.
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INTRODUCTION
The subject of high grade (forward cost < $ 30) uranium's
availability is significant for the following reason. After the known
high grade uranium is depleted, it has been assumed that the nation
will have to turn to low grade deposits for its power needs. These
deposits, such as the Chattanooga Shale and the Conway Granite, are
known to contain more uranium than the nation is projected to need
within the next fifty years. However, the cost of uranium from these
deposits would be very high. For instance, production costs from the
Shale have been estimated to reach as high as $150 per pound U30 8
(uranium oxide), relative to current market prices below $8 per pound.
Should the low cost resources prove to be insufficient to meet
our power needs, utilization of the Liquid Metal Fast Breeder Reactor
(LMFBR) would be an economical alternative to electricity generation with
high cost uranium. The LMFBR would produce more nuclear fuel than it
consumed. It would economize on high cost uranium by conyerting otherwise
useless U238, by far the most abundant isotope, into Plutonium 239.
Plutonium, in turn, could be utilized in conventional-type nuclear reactors
to produce electricity.
This report presents a time analysis of uranium exploration,
production and known reserves in the United States. This type of analysis
is often utilized in other mineral/fuel industries to elucidate trends.
As such, it is useful in providing a qualitive indication of the potential
undiscovered uranium reserves that now exist.
There are several indications that the nation's high grade uranium
resources are greater than presently known. One, exploration of the
regions currently producing uranium is incomplete. Historically, con-
tinued drilling in these areas has indicated the existence of additional
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uranium resources. Two, all the exploration to date has been for the
highest grade ($8 forward cost) ore. If the industry begins to search
for higher cost ores (forward costs between $10 and $30) more may be
discovered. Three, the regions currently producing uranium comprise
less than 10% of the land in the Western United States known to be favorable
for uranium occurrences (the currently producing regions contain the bulk
of the known and estimated high grade uranium reserves). And four, there
is a potential for high grade uranium occurrences in regions other than
the Western U. S.
However, knowledge on the extent of the high grade resources is
limited. Thus, quantitative evaluations at this time must be classified
in some sense as speculation. Knowledge is limited because no effort has
yet been made to determine the size of the entire resource base.
The A.E.C. has formulated supply curve estimates for the potential
uranium supply. For example, such supply curve estimates were utilized
in the Cost-Benefit Analysis published as part of the LMFBR Environmental
Impact Statement Draft (WASH-1535). This analysis includes uranium require-
ments projections through the year 2020. A number of cases are considered
for different LMFBR introduction dates, and no LMFBR introduction during
the period. On casual observation, their uranium supply estimates seem
to span a reasonable range of uncertainty in the potential supply. However,
even in their "optimistic" case, they assume that the nation eventually
must utilize the low grade, high cost deposits during this period if the
LMFBR is not introduced. In light of the uncertainty involved, and the
sensitivity of the expected market price to the uranium supply assumptions,
the author feels a more liberal "optimistic case" would be appropriate
in performing such analyses; high grade resources could prove to be in
excess of demand. The author has concluded that a quantitative evaluation
of the high grade uranium resources should be part of the nation's energy
research effort.
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THE URANIUM INDUSTRY
Uranium resources are explored and developed by private industry.
There are roughly eighty five firms engaged in this activity.
The term "resources", when used in regard to a mineral/fuel, refers
to all the mineral contained in ores, regardless of their current commercial
worth. "Resource" includes both known and undiscovered deposits. "Re-
serves" are the resources that comprise the industry's current working stock.
This is the quantity of uranium, in known deposits, calculated to be
producible at a given (usually market) price. The physical characteristics,
quantity, and grade of these deposits have been established with reasonable
certainty.
The deposit's characteristics are determined by detailed sampling,
usually by exploratory and development drilling. Delineation of the
deposit's characteristics must be completed before the decision is made to
begin development.
The lead time for converting deposits to reserves, from the initiation
of exploratory drilling to production, is about eight years. Physical limit-
ations and economics preclude bringing the deposits into production in a
shorter interval. Thus, reserve quantities adequate to meet cumulative
projected demand eight years in advance are considered a minimum to assure
adequate supplies. Historical data indicate that the industry maintained
roughly a ten year advance supply from the middle 60's to the present.
A considerable expenditure is required to convert resources into re-
serves, i.e. to delineate prospective deposits so they can be developed.
These costs have historically run almost 30% of the uranium market price 1].
Thus, exploration and development efforts are largely restricted to the
industry's current needs.
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Before a firm will commit the investment to.delineate a deposit,
previous exploratory evidence must indicate the existence of a sufficiently
large commercial grade ore body. Once it has been delineated, the explor-
ation and property acquisition costs are irrevocably allocated. At this
point, the company is committed to developing the deposit. The profitability
of the uranium formation at a given market price is determined by its
characteristics, i.e., the quantity and grade of material whose marginal
production cost is below the market price. The marginal production cost
only covers the cost mining the ore, transporting it to the mill, and
mill processing the uranium material. When the firm exploits the
deposit, it will withdraw all the material for which the marginal
production cost is less than the market price 1 9].
The market price itself is determined by supply/demand interactions.
Utilities bid for the available uranium in both a current and a futures
market. In the futures market, if the low cost supplies to be available
were insufficient to meet the demand, the price would be bid upwards.
Higher prices would increase available supplies in two ways. First, the
higher market price would expand the amount of ore than could be commercially
mined. Additional ore, at higher marginal production costs, could be
economically withdrawn from producing deposits. Second, the higher prices
would encourage the uranium companies to explore for.uranium, as the higher
prices would increase the industry's profitability. The same reasoning
applies to an excess of uranium, depressing prices, available supplies and
exploration.
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URANIUM RESERVES
Estimates of domestic uranium reserves are formulated by the
Grand Junction,' Colorado Office of the A.E.C. These estimates are based
on information supplied by the firms developing the uranium deposits.
As this information is proprietary, no independent reserves estimates
exist.
The A.E.C. collects data on deposit grade, thickness, depth, and
other relevant information. On the basis of these characteristics, a
cut-off, or minimum, grade, in per cent U308, is determined which can
be developed at the given "forward cost". The "forward cost" can be
considered to be a marginal production cost, which just covers the cost
of getting the ore out of the ground and to market. The cost calculations
consider the mining, hauling and milling operations and the royalty payments
only. Any material at a grade equal to or above the cut-off isconsidered
a reserve at the particular forward cost. Other uranium production costs
are not considered in the estimation of forward costs. These expenses
include property acquisition costs, exploration costs, and profit[ 2 ].
The A.E.C. has been estimating $8, $10, and $15 and $30 forward cost
reserves since 1962, 1965, 1967 and 1973, respectively. Each year, the $8
and $10 reserve.estimates are published in Statistical Data of the Uranium
Industry (GJO-100). The higher cost reserve estimates are not released
in an organized fashion.
These reserve estimates are made on the basis of current dollars.
Until recently, inflation has been offset by industry productivity increases.
The high inflation rates we are currently experiencing, however, are not
being equaled by higher productivity. This will be a factor in reserve
estimates for 1974, diminishing the quantity of uranium available at each
forward cost[3]
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In recent years, uranium production has been derived from $8
reserves. The A.E.C. estimates of these reserve quantities are displayed
in Figure 1 by year. Before 1962, reserves were estimated on a basis
other than $8 forward cost. However, the estimates do approximate the
industry's working stock.
Note there are two periods during which reserve quantities were
rapidly increasing: 1954 through 1959 and 1966 through 1971. Beginning
in 1948, the A.E.C. instituted a program to stimulate domestic uranium
production. Purchases were guaranteed at fixed prices, bonuses were offered
for initial production from new mines, and air and ground surveys were
conducted to locate new deposits [5]. Thus, exploration and reserves
were on the increase. This program was brought to a close when the A.E.C.
announced in November, 1958, that it would no longer purchase uranium ore.
Thereafter, reserve quantities declined because yearly production exceeded
additions to reserves. During the mid-sixties, demand for uranium began
to increase as a result of the growing civilian power industry. Thus,
exploration intensified, and reserve quantities increased. Exploration
began to wane after 1969, however, as licensing and construction delays
reduced the short term demand.
These trends are again illustrated in Figures 2 and 3. Figure
2 displays the sum of reserves and cumulative production, thus "known
uranium" by year. The yearly drilling level and additions to reserves
are presented in Figure 3. Note the upsurge in drilling that occurred
in the late 50's and late 60's. These high drilling levels resulted in
large additions to reserves, thus, rapid increases in the quantity of
"known uranium".
In viewing Figure 3, the reader probably noted that the reserve
additions during the 1967 through 1971 period required significantly
more drilling than during the 1955 through 1959 period. Thus, the
uranium was discovered at a lower "finding rate", expressed in pounds
U308 (uranium oxide) per foot of drilling.
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The finding rate for each year's drilling is.displayed on Figure
4. In mineral/fuel industries, yearly finding rates of this sort are
normally erratic. However, there is a definite peak in the curve in
the last half of the 50's. Thereafter, it appears as if the finding rate
has more or less stabilized below 4 lbs/ft.
These finding rate curves by year can be somewhat misleading in
that no indication is given of the relative importance'of a year's drilling.
To give a truer indication of the finding trends, the finding rate should
be weighted by the year's total drilling footage. Thus, the integral of
the finding rate and the drilling level, i.e., known uranium, is often
plotted against cumulative drilling. The slope of the resulting curve is
the finding rate.
Known uranium ($8 reserves plus cumulative production) is displayed
against cumulative drilling in Figure 5. As was indicated in Figure 4,
finding rates were high during the middle and late 50's, averaging. 10.4
pounds per foot. Thereafter, the finding rate has averaged roughly 3.4
lbs./ft.
The very high finding rates in the 50's probably resulted from.the
exploration of deposits closer to the surface than those presently being
developed. Such deposits were probably located during the course of
the A.E.C.'s ground and air radiation surveys previously conducted. Al-
though data on the average depth per well extends back only to 1958, the
trend exhibited by the available data supports this hypothesis. Average
depth has been increasing, from 150 feet in 1958 to 480 feet in 1973.
This increase, roughly a factor of three, accounts for most of the decrease
in the finding rate.
The finding rates have been relatively low recently (2.0 pounds/
foot in 1973), however, and officials at the A.E.C. have indicated the
"dry spell." has continued through 1974. Whether or not the industry will
-16-
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continue to encounter this relative difficulty in finding uranium is not
known. However, this-relative lack of success has not.decreased reserve
estimates.
A trend of lower finlding rates around 2 pounds/toot would probably
increase the long term uranium market price by about $3 per pound, ceteris
paribus[8] This is a large increase, relative to $8 per pound uranium.
However, this increase to the cost of all high grade uranium (< $30/lb.),
relative to the projected costs for production from low grade ores, is.not
a significant factor.
The conditions that motivated the upsurge in drilling between 1965
and 1971 are revealed in Figure 6. Reserves are plotted by year against
10 year advance requirements. Also plotted is the annual drilling level.
Observe that reserves are declining between 1961 and 1965, when reserve
quantities were greater than 10 year advance requirements. Exploratory
drilling was at a low level, hence additions to reserves were small and
yearly production drew down reserves.
From 1966 to 1968, the 10 year forward requirements exceeded re-
serves. Drilling levels, hence additions to reserves, were on the increase.
Drilling peaked in 1969. Thereafter, the licensing and construction delays
resulted in a downward revision of uranium requirements projections.
Drilling and additions to reserves thus declined.
For 1973, advance requirements are again in excess of reserves.
One would thus expect that drilling will increase in 1974. However,
industry does not plan a large enough drilling increase to meet advance
requirements. This fact has received considerable publicity recently, at
least within the uranium industry.
The explanation for this follows. The expertise and equipment re-
quired for uranium exploration is similar to that for coal, shale and oil
exploration. The uranium industry is having to compete for these services.
-18-
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High returns and relatively short lead times re vailable in the fo,'Jil
fuel sect;ors. the uranlum industry, on the other hanMd, fa.tes loli!ler lnlad
times. In addition, the returns are not as certain, as the electricity
consumption growth rate and utility commitment to nuclear power have been
put in question recently. Thus, some of the industry's capacity for
exploration has been shifted to fossil fuels. In addition, the industries
that produce exploration equipment are operating at the limit of their
capacity. They are beset with steel and other materials shortages. Waiting
times for new drilling rigs are about two years[l1].
Although the industry is currently unable to maintain uranium
resources at desirable levels, there is no danger of depleting uranium
reserves, at least for thetime being. Higher cost reserves are known
to be available. The A.E.C. estimates of higher cost reserves are plotted
by year in Figure 7. Note the increases in the reserves estimates between
1967 and 1971.
The ore that comprises these reserves is of a nature similar to
the $8 reserves, i.e. it is contained in sandstone deposits. All of this
material is in formations associated with the $8 reserves. It is, however,
at a lower concentration, or in formations that are more expensive to mine
than the $8 reserves. This uranium was discovered in the course of
exploring for and developing the $8 ore. As a result, A.E.C. uranium
experts concur that it is likely additional quantities of the higher cost
resources remain to be discovered. If the exploration efforts were directed
specifically toward that end, as opposed to being directed toward the
discovery of $8 ore only, more might be found.
These higher cost ore estimates need some qualification, however.
In the process of mining the higher grade material, ome of the lower grade
ore can be "lost", i.e., rendered available only at a significantly higher
cost. For instance, if a quantity of $8 ore is mined and depleted, and the
hole is filled, the associated lower grade uranium left in the ground will
be more expensive to produce than was originally estimated.
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When uranium prices were-near $8 per pound and no trouble was
encountered in the discovery of additional high grade uranium, some $10
and $15 material was lost. The reserve levels for $10 and $15 ore were
maintained over the years despite these losses.
The extent to which lower grade ore will be "lost" in the future
depends on the market conditions. If contract prices for delivery in
1980 remain close to $20, where they are currently, losses of $10 and
$15 reserves will probably be negligible. If significant discoveries of
$8 ore are made, however, and the uranium price drops, the losses would
be greater. Thus, the degree to which current higher cost reserves are
lost is dependent on the extent of future uranium discoveries and demand.
The fact that uranium prices for delivery in 1980 are almost $20
is not necessarily an indication that $8 reserves are nearing depletion.
An unprecedented expansion of the industry, in terms of reserves to
meet advance requirements, and mine and mill (for ore processing)
capacity, must begin to meet demand in 1980 and beyond. This, plus the
rapid escalation of all energy prices over the last year has resulted
in a significant escalation of uranium contract prices for delivery
around 1980. The high prices are simply a signal for the industry to
begin this expansion.
* **
To summarize, the level of exploration and the level of known
uranium have been governed by demand. Advance requirements have provided
a limited motivation for uranium exploration. Assuming the industry will,
from this point, discover no more high grade resources is clearly arbitrary.
However, the industry is currently experiencing difficulties at maintaining
forward requirements, but these are not problems of insufficient uranium
resources. Rather, they are the result of the peculiar conditions the
uranium industry and the entire economy now face.
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POTENTIAL RESOURCES
In addition to the reserves estimates, the A.E.C. has formulated
yearly "potential resource" estimates. As in the estimation of reserves,
the A.E.C. estimation of potential reserves is made on the basis of
"forward costs". The A.E.C. has published estimates since 1968, 1966,
and 1974 for $8, $10, and $30 forward costs, respectively. Estimates of
$15 forward cost potential reserves have not been released in an organized
fashion for years prior to 1974.
These estimates are not attempts to assess the total resource base.
This estimation is restricted to uranium in conventional sandstone deposits
and consists primarily of uranium surmised to occur in unexplored extensions
of known deposits and postulated deposits within known uranium areas[l3 ' 14]
Thus, these estimations are based on extrapolations of known deposits in
areas adjacent to those well explored. There is, of course, some uncertainty
in them. However, as the industry has encountered little difficulty in
maintaining reserves at an appropriate level, there has been little incentive
to verify the estimates.
The potential reserve estimates are intended toapproximate the
quantity of uranium contained within the producing areas. Thus, one
could expect that more intensive exploration, within these regions, would
result in increasing the known reserves at the expense of the potential
reserves. However, precisely the opposite has been the-case. Figure 8
displays the A.E.C. estimates of proven and potential reserves by year of
estimation. Observe that known and potential uranium, in both the $8
and $10 cut off categories, nearly doubled between 1968 and 1970. Perhaps
this is an indication of the thoroughness (or lack thereof) with which
these regions have been explored.
-22-
$ 10 POTENTIAL
1.0
$8 POTENTIALa
I-
cp
0.5
$ 1o RESERVES
$8 RESERVES
Uranium Reserve Estimates
1
Fure 8: Proven
- ' nrlaI
Source: reference 15
7 
CUMULATIVE RODUCTO
1968
-23-
These increases were based on the new data made avatlable by the
high drilling levels during those years. The additional potential re-
sources are estimated to be in the three principal uranium producing
regions: the Colorado Plateau, the Wyoming Basins, and the Texas Gulf
Coast Plains [1 6 ]. These areas are displayed on Figure 9. 95% of proven
reserves and approximately 85% of potential reserves are located in
these producing regions, (darkly shaded)[1 4]. To date, the extent of the
exploration of these areas is termed incomplete [1 7 ]. Yet, the presently
producing areas comprise less than 10 percent of the total area of the
Western United States in which uranium occurrences have been found
(lightly shaded in Figure 10). Because there are still ample opportunities
for exploration in the producing areas, there has been little incentive
to explore in the other regions.
-24-
Figure 9: KNOWN URANIUM REGIONS IN THE WESTERN UNITED STATES
[Source: Reference 16]
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NATIONAL URANIUM RESOURCE EVALUATION
A National Uranium Resource Evaluation (NURE) study is now under-
way to better determine the nature and extent of the nation's uranium
resources. The study is being performed at the Grand Junction, Colorado,
Office of the Atomic Energy Commission. Preliminary results will be
available in 1975. Final results will not be available for several
years.
The sole purpose of the study is to identify geogra'phic regions
within the U.S. that possess a potential for commercial uranium resources.
By disseminating this information, the A.E.C. thus hopes to encourage
private industry to explore the areas they identify. Neither the A.E.C.
nor any other government agency plan to explore for uranium.
Based on their present knowledge, the officials conducting the
study are "hopeful and optimistic" that significant quantities of high
grade (forward cost < $30) uranium remain to be discovered. The A.E.C.
experts consider the possibility of substantial additional ore discoveries
in the $15 to $30 range particularly promising. They expect that these
resources may be discovered both in conventional sandstone deposits
and in other geological strata. Potential for such discoveries exists
in the Western United States, as well as in areas in the Eastern United
States. Furthermore, geographic regions of Alaska are known to be
highly similar to those regions currently producing in the Rocky Mountain
areas[12]
-26-
C N C L U S IO N S
The outlook for discoveries of at least some uranium beyond that
presently known is practically a certainty. The prospect for the
discovery of substantial additional quantities is bright. At this time,
however, there is simply no factual basis for a quantitative appraisal
of the undiscovered high grade resources.
As of January 1, 1974, the A.E.C. estimated that 2.4 million tons
of U308 (reserves and potential) are available at a forward cost less than
or equal to $30 per pound [1 8] . In the draft of the LMFBR Environmental
Impact Statement (WASH-1535), cumulative uranium usage, without the breeder,
is projected to reach 6.3 million tons by 2020. The most optimistic supply
estimate used in that study is based on the assumption that known high
grade (forward cost < $30) uranium will be roughly double current estimates
(2.4 million tons) of reserves and potential. The supply estimates are,
by the A.E.C.'s own admission, judgemental[ 1 9] .
In light of the potential for additional discoveries, the fact that
reserves and potential increased by over 80% between 1968 and 1970 alone
(see Figure 8, page 22) and the sensitivity of the expected uranium prices
to the supply assumptions, the author feels that the A.E.C. estimates may
be conservative. High grade uranium resources could prove to be in excess
of cumulative demand.
The reason no quantitative estimates of the entire resource base
are available is that no effort has been made, up to this point, to make
such an appraisal. In addition, no significant effort is being made at
this time. The NURE will simply serve to define areas of potential
deposits. It will take several years to complete, and, most importantly,
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it will provide no more quantitative information on the nation's uranium
resource base than is consistent with the industry's current needs.
Private industry will explore for only as much uranium as the market
will demand ten-years hence. As a result, if an assessment of the
entire resource base is desired in the near future, the government will
have to take the initiative.
As the nation plans to utilize uranium-fueled nuclear reactors
to satisfy a significant portion of its future power needs, the author
feels a quantitative appraisal of our uranium resources base is necessary
for long range planning. The author.specifically proposes that the
effort to achieve the goals of the NURE study be intensified. The author
further advocates. that intensive exploratory drilling be conducted in those
regions identified as holding a potential for high grade resources. Thus,
the appraisal of the region would be either confirmed or refuted, and a
quantitative "potential resource" estimate could be made,
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